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Appointment of an administrator over company assets under the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) is a means by which company property may be protected for the benefit 
of creditors and shareholders in the face of actual or anticipated insolvency.  
Creditors’ and shareholders’ interests in or claims upon company property are often 
in conflict with those of third parties – such as lessors of real property who might 
seek to forfeit the company’s lease and regain possession of property.  In these 
circumstances, the tenant company in administration may make a claim for relief 
against forfeiture or call upon the application of a s444 moratorium.  As two recent 
cases show, such a moratorium may be extended beyond the expiration or 
termination of a deed of company arrangement.  This paper examines the decisions 
in Kelly and Morris v Hedz Pty Ltd (voluntary administrators appointed) (receiver 
and managers appointed) [2010] QSC (30 July 2010) and Strazdins v Birch Carroll 
& Coyle 178 FCR 300 to examine the extent to which s444 declarations can be 
considered to align with or augment equitable relief. 
 
Last year my co-author ran a case in the Supreme Court in Cairns for administrators 
of a company that was also under receivership.  The company was called Hedz Pty 
Ltd and its business was hotelier.  The goal of the receivers was to continue to 
conduct the various hotel businesses leading towards a structured sale process.  It was 
therefore important to have continued and uninterrupted possession of the premises 
used by the company. The deed of company arrangement was therefore subject to 
relief against forfeiture or relief under s444F of the Corporations Act.   
The issue was that the company’s landlord was objecting to the proposed deed of 
company arrangement.  In fact, one of the company’s landlords had purported to 
forfeit the lease based on the company’s breach of the lease – because of the 
appointment of the receivers. 
Relevantly, the lease commenced in 2007 for a term of 30 years with two 15 year 
options.  The landlord purchased the freehold with the lease after Hedz had gone into 
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receivership, and issued a statutory notice to remedy breach of covenant after it 
became the owner. 
The primary secured creditor, ANZ, had undertaken to pay all rent and outgoings and 
to underwrite the obligations under the lease. 
Insolvency practitioners are universally aware of the moratorium presently effected 
by section 440C of the Act. The moratorium prevents owners or lessors from 
interfering with possession of property that is in the possession of, or used by, the 
company.  The moratorium lasts for the duration of the voluntary administration 
however section 444F provides an opportunity for that moratorium to be extended 
beyond the voluntary administration, and in some cases, beyond the expiration or 
termination of a deed of company arrangement (“DOCA”).   
It was this extended relief under s444F that was the focus of the administrators’ 
application in Hedz. 
There are two preconditions to an order being made under this section.  First, the 
owner/lessor’s actions would have a material adverse effect on achieving the purposes 
of the deed of company arrangement.  Secondly, the interests of the owner/lessor must 
be adequately protected.   
In Hedz, the landlord resisted the application on the basis that there would be no 
material adverse effect on achieving the purposes of the deed, and that the owner’s 
interests were not adequately protected. 
Before I look further into how the court treated these arguments, I’ll briefly outline 
the circumstances in an earlier case that was relied on in Hedz.  This is Strazdins v 
Birch Caroll & Coyle. 
In this case, the tenant company had 9 years to run of its lease from BCC when 
administrators were appointed.  The landlord issued notice of default pursuant to the 
appointment, but subsequently offered the tenant a new three year lease. 
As occurred in Hedz, the administrators applied for an extended moratorium to 
protect the company’s occupation of the business premises.  The financial statements 
showed that the business was running profitably, and the financial obligations under 
the lease were secured by a bank guarantee.  
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The landlord however resisted the deed of company arrangement on the bases that 
there would be no material adverse effect on the company, and that the landlord’s 
interests were not protected by the granting of the order. 
Material adverse effect 
In each case, the court found that there would indeed be a material adverse effect on 
the deed of company arrangement.  If the lease were not protected, then the deed 
would fail and the company in each case would go into liquidation.  In Hedz, the 
respondent argued that there would be no material adverse effect overall on creditors 
–even if the deed itself were frustrated.  The judge disagreed.  The main purpose of 
the deed of company arrangement was to continue the business operations and the 
loss of this would result in a poor outcome for employees and unsecured creditors. 
Protecting interest of landlord/owner 
Strazdins had some interesting argument about protecting the landlord’s interests.  
The landlord argued that it had a right to choose its own tenant, and to grant a shorter 
lease if it wanted to.  The court however found that it was the landlord’s rights under 
the lease that were to be protected in terms of the section, not any broader commercial 
rights as owner. 
In Hedz, the landlord’s concern was securing the non-financial obligations under the 
lease, such as to repair, and the ‘post-doca’ situation where the landlord would be left 
with a tenant that was hopelessly insolvent.  Neither of these arguments was 
successful.  The receivers had given an undertaking to cause the company to maintain 
its obligations under the lease.  In addition, the landlord had taken on the tenant 
knowing it was already under administration – so there was no material change to its 
situation. 
Forfeiture 
What we were interested in about these cases was the extent to which this remedy 
might mirror or deviate from an award of relief against forfeiture.  We wondered 
whether there was any material difference in the considerations for an award.  So if 
you were an administrator, would there be any benefit in selecting one form of relief 
against another? 
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Today I’ll focus on a couple of aspects of relief against forfeiture that bear 
comparison with the relief under s444F.  The first of these is the principle that 
underpins each form of relief.  Secondly, is the nature of the relief itself – forfeiture is 
regarded as “an ultimate security mechanism to ensure compliance”. Finally is the 
measure of protection of the leasehold interest afforded under each remedy. 
The starting point was the statement of the key considerations annunciated in Shiloh 
Spinners v Harding.  You will recall the relevant considerations in assessing whether 
to afford relief are:1 
a) the conduct of the assignee (tenant);  
b) whether or not the breach was wilful; and  
c) the nature and gravity of the breach, and its relation to the value of the 
property which might be forfeited. 
The principle underpinning relief against forfeiture is unconscionability.  In 
considering the elements, the court will have an eye on whether the landlord would 
have a wholly disproportionate benefit.  Obviously this is not a consideration in the 
s444F action – the relevant consideration here is simply that the landlord’s interests 
are adequately protected.  However this does seem an equivalent outcome of the two 
types of relief, albeit approached from a different direction. 
In each case too, the courts are reluctant to ‘reshape contractual obligations’ to 
achieve something more fair.  In Strazdins, the court discounted the landlord’s right to 
rewrite the commercial arrangement – and said that all that would be protected is the 
landlord’s right under the lease that existed at the time of the administration. 
The focus of the relief appears on first blush to differ.  Forfeiture is concerned with 
the landlord tenant relationship but administration and attendant relief is focused on 
the position of creditors under the deed of company arrangement.  The landlord tenant 
relationship is secondary. 
However there is case law to suggest that this is relevant in relief against forfeiture 
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The old (1895) case of Howard v Fanshawe held that relief was available regardless 
of how the tenant became unable to pay – provided the arrears were made good, then 
relief would be available.   
In Hayes v Gunbola (1988, NSW) to give relief to an insolvent person “may be in the 
public interest because the benefit of the valuable property in the lease will inure for 
the creditors generally should he become bankrupt.”2   
In MI Design Pty Ltd v Dunecar Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 996 (“MI Design”) relief 
was awarded “notwithstanding the Plaintiff’s present insolvency”.  The basis for this 
decision was that “there is no real doubt that any prospect the tenant has of salvaging 
its position would be completely lost if re-entry were not allowed.”3 
In Lindholm, a 2011 federal court decision, the Court found that if relief were not 
given, unsecured creditors would be no worse off but that the secured creditor would 
“risk a substantial loss.”4  This informed its decision to award relief against forfeiture 
– that is to say, the public policy position of third parties is relevant in considering 
whether to award relief against forfeiture.  This brings this form of relief closer to the 
rationale behind Corporations Act moratorium. 
Finally, what is perhaps of most interest is the nature of the protection afforded by 
each form of relief.  This was highlighted in Lindholm, in the matter of Munday 
Group Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liquidation) v Tsourlinis 
Distributors Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 195 (9 March 2011). 
This case involved an application for relief against forfeiture or in the alternative, 
relief under s444F.  The court didn’t have to consider the latter, because it awarded 
relief against forfeiture.  However in obiter it raised a number of concerns about the 
operation of s444F that confirm our own analysis of the two forms of relief. 
While there is perhaps not much to separate these two forms of relief in whether to 
grant them, the effect of relief is somewhat different.  In relief against forfeiture,  
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As with relief against forfeiture, a s444F application will operate regardless of 
whether the lease has been terminated.  In Strazdins the owner had submitted that the 
lease had been validly terminated, and that as a consequence s444F could not operate.  
Lander J addressed that argument. 
The power to make an order under section 444F(4) is not dependent upon a valid lease being 
in place but is dependent upon the property being used or occupied by the company being in 
possession of the property.   
This implies a focus on retaining for the tenant a possessory rather than a proprietary 
right.  Indeed, in contrast to the order upon a termination under relief against 
forfeiture, s444F “does not contemplate” an order reinstating the lease.5  The order 
“will have the effect of requiring [the tenant] to comply in all respects with the lease 
as if it were on foot,”6 but not it seems affirming the lease itself.  As the Court pointed 
out in obiter in Lindholm, this opens questions about the landlord’s rights and 
obligations.  As there is no lease, the terms upon which the tenant holds its possessory 
rights and the landlord’s rights to enforce the tenant’s obligations are uncertain. 
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